Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments

DOI10.3982/TE3329zbMath1448.91118OpenAlexW3125378827WikidataQ126668948 ScholiaQ126668948MaRDI QIDQ5121486

Wioletta Dziuda, David Austen-Smith, Bård Harstad, Antoine Loeper

Publication date: 14 September 2020

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3329

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesbargainingpolitical economypolitical instruments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (2)

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Cites Work

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