Tight Revenue Gaps Among Simple Mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5123985
DOI10.1137/19M126178XzbMath1462.65067arXiv1804.00480OpenAlexW2963882139MaRDI QIDQ5123985
Pinyan Lu, Yaonan Jin, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Tao Xiao
Publication date: 17 September 2020
Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.00480
Analysis of algorithms (68W40) Numerical mathematical programming methods (65K05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (2)
Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms ⋮ Optimal revenue guarantees for pricing in large markets
Cites Work
- Stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables: A complete comparison by conjugate duality
- Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing
- The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
- Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
- Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders
- Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors
- Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
- Regret Minimization for Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions
- Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Semiamarts and finite values
- Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities
- Beating 1-1/e for ordered prophets
- Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
- On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
- Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing
- Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms
- Prophet Secretary Through Blind Strategies
- Optimal competitive auctions
- Prophet Secretary
- Beyond matroids: secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints
- A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
- An n-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications
- Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
- Matroid prophet inequalities
- Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
- Tight welfare guarantees for pure Nash equilibria of the uniform price auction
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
This page was built for publication: Tight Revenue Gaps Among Simple Mechanisms
