Designing Dynamic Contests

DOI10.1287/opre.2018.1823zbMath1455.91143OpenAlexW2922191721MaRDI QIDQ5126604

Kostas Bimpikis, Mohamed Mostagir, Shayan Ehsani

Publication date: 20 October 2020

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1823

zbMATH Keywords

learninginformationcontestsdynamic competitionopen innovation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (9)

The efficacy of tournament designs ⋮ Observation delays in teams and effort cycles ⋮ Parallel Innovation Contests ⋮ Innovation contests with risk‐averse participants ⋮ Innovation through competitive experimentation ⋮ Strategic experimentation with private payoffs ⋮ Strategic observation with exponential bandits ⋮ Large tournament games ⋮ Information Disclosure and Pricing Policies for Sales of Network Goods

Cites Work

• On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions
• The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
• Deadlines in stochastic contests
• Contest architecture
• Negatively Correlated Bandits
• All-Pay Contests
• Racing with Uncertainty
• Strategic Experimentation
• Optimal Award Scheme in Innovation Tournaments
• A Perpetual Race to Stay Ahead
• Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits

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