Long-Term Partnership for Achieving Efficient Capacity Allocation

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2019.1878zbMath1455.91136OpenAlexW3123175912WikidataQ127520908 ScholiaQ127520908MaRDI QIDQ5129174

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Publication date: 26 October 2020

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1878

zbMATH Keywords

implementationinvestmentdynamic mechanism designcapacity allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

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