Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
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Publication:512948
DOI10.1007/s10479-016-2124-5zbMath1406.91106OpenAlexW2263481943MaRDI QIDQ512948
Roberto Lucchetti, Josep Freixas
Publication date: 3 March 2017
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/84162
Related Items (5)
The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games ⋮ The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games ⋮ An Axiomatization for Two Power Indices for (3,2)-Simple Games ⋮ The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory? ⋮ Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
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