Optimal Signaling of Content Accuracy: Engagement vs. Misinformation

DOI10.1287/opre.2019.1897zbMath1455.91178OpenAlexW2765198270MaRDI QIDQ5131472

Ozan Candogan, Kimon Drakopoulos

Publication date: 8 November 2020

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1897

zbMATH Keywords

social networksmisinformationinformation designfake newsonline platforms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

Related Items (6)

Information Inundation on Platforms and Implications ⋮ Learning Manipulation Through Information Dissemination ⋮ Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents ⋮ Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and Cores ⋮ Global manipulation by local obfuscation ⋮ Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication

Uses Software

• SNAP
• Gephi

Cites Work

• Spread of (mis)information in social networks
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Competitive Targeted Advertising Over Networks
• Targeted Information Release in Social Networks
• “We Will Be Right with You”: Managing Customer Expectations with Vague Promises and Cheap Talk
• Analysis and Comparison of Queues with Different Levels of Delay Information
• Optimal Pricing in Networks with Externalities
• Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games

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