Incomplete Contract, Transaction-Specific Investment, and Bargaining Power

DOI10.1007/978-981-15-3300-6_2zbMath1452.91163OpenAlexW3013152946MaRDI QIDQ5132563

Moriki Hosoe

Publication date: 12 November 2020

Published in: Applied Economic Analysis of Information and Risk (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3300-6_2

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsbargaining powertransaction-specific investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation

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