Effort Observability and Wage Promotion in an Internal Labor Market

DOI10.1007/978-981-15-3300-6_5zbMath1452.91178OpenAlexW3013599983MaRDI QIDQ5132566

Moriki Hosoe

Publication date: 12 November 2020

Published in: Applied Economic Analysis of Information and Risk (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3300-6_5

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent probleminternal labor marketoptimal wage contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

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