Revenue and reserve prices in a probabilistic single item auction

DOI10.1007/s00453-015-0055-1zbMath1358.91055OpenAlexW2284693485MaRDI QIDQ513288

Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz, Noga Alon

Publication date: 6 March 2017

Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-015-0055-1

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationsecond price auctionsreserve pricessingle item auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction

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