On the role of fairness and limited backward induction in sequential bargaining games. New behavioral models and analyses

DOI10.1007/s10472-015-9481-7zbMath1358.91020OpenAlexW2198433289MaRDI QIDQ513351

Prashant Doshi, Xia Qu

Publication date: 6 March 2017

Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-015-9481-7

zbMATH Keywords

fairnesssequential bargaining gamebehavioral data modelinglimited backward induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

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• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• A Simplex Method for Function Minimization

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