The context of the game

DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0938-zzbMath1405.91011OpenAlexW2273518840MaRDI QIDQ513591

Amanda Friedenberg, Martin Meier

Publication date: 7 March 2017

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0938-z

zbMATH Keywords

robustnesscontextBayesian gameshierarchies of beliefsuniversal type structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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