Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_10zbMath1454.91148OpenAlexW2968946613MaRDI QIDQ5140361

Denis Claude, Mabel Maria Tidball

Publication date: 15 December 2020

Published in: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02283174/file/VEP2nd.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

delegationexternalityvertical relationsmanagerial incentivesprecommitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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