Compliance with Social Norms as an Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_16zbMath1454.91087OpenAlexW2968230740MaRDI QIDQ5140369

Francisco Cabo, Ana García-González, Mercedes Molpeceres-Abella

Publication date: 15 December 2020

Published in: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37883

zbMATH Keywords

social normsPrisoner's dilemma gameheterogeneous preferencessnowdrift gametwo-population evolutionary game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?
• An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
• Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments
• Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching

This page was built for publication: Compliance with Social Norms as an Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium