Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2020.1994zbMath1458.91121OpenAlexW3082456387MaRDI QIDQ5144775

Xiangyin Kong, Yimin Yu

Publication date: 19 January 2021

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.1994

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardincentiveslinear contractsworst-case criterionrobust contract design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items (2)

Robust optimization approaches for purchase planning with supplier selection under lead time uncertainty ⋮ Salesforce contracting under model uncertainty

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