On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games

DOI10.1007/s00199-016-1010-3zbMath1401.91022OpenAlexW1562173397WikidataQ59615577 ScholiaQ59615577MaRDI QIDQ514491

Nizar Allouch, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 2 March 2017

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1010-3

zbMATH Keywords

coresmall group effectivenessapproximate corescoalition formationNTU gamespayoff-dependent balancedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

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