Ambiguous implementation: the partition model

DOI10.1007/s00199-016-1023-yzbMath1404.91153OpenAlexW2564410999MaRDI QIDQ514494

Nicholas C. Yannelis, Luciano I. de Castro, Zhi-Wei Liu

Publication date: 2 March 2017

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1023-y

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmaximin equilibriummaximin preferencesmaximin efficient allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility, Incentive compatibility under ambiguity, Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity, Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium, A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility, Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity, Optimality in an OLG model with nonsmooth preferences, Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility, Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization, On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences, Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver, Robust coalitional implementation, Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

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