Duplication monotonicity in the allocation of indivisible goods

DOI10.3233/AIC-190613zbMath1464.91055OpenAlexW2966903407MaRDI QIDQ5145454

Jörg Rothe, Benno Kuckuck

Publication date: 20 January 2021

Published in: AI Communications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3233/aic-190613

zbMATH Keywords

fair divisioncomputational social choiceduplication monotonicityscoring allocation rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

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