Evolutionary Tax Evasion, Prospect Theory and Heterogeneous Taxpayers

DOI10.1007/978-981-15-3623-6_5zbMath1457.91260OpenAlexW3015395929MaRDI QIDQ5148536

Domenico De Giovanni, Mario Pezzino, Fabio Lamantia

Publication date: 4 February 2021

Published in: Games and Dynamics in Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3623-6_5

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controlprospect theorytax evasionauditingcontrolled evolutionary dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (3)

Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: Integrating Evolutionary Game into the Optimal Control of Government Policy ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers ⋮ Revealing bifurcation mechanisms in a 2D nonsmooth map by means of the first return map

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents
• Using dynamic programming with adaptive grid scheme for optimal control problems in economics
• Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
• Dynamic harvesting under imperfect catch control
• Prospect theory and tax evasion: a reconsideration of the Yitzhaki puzzle
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• The Probability Weighting Function

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