The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences

DOI10.1142/S0219198920400058zbMath1494.91100MaRDI QIDQ5149578

Mohsen Pourpouneh, Rasoul Ramezanian, Arunava Sen

Publication date: 11 February 2021

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

interdependent preferencesmarriage problem\textit{ex-post} incentive compatibilitymodified priority rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

The limits of ex post implementation without transfers ⋮ Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

Cites Work

• Non-bossiness
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences