Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets)
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Publication:5149725
DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_99zbMath1457.91040OpenAlexW4211223662MaRDI QIDQ5149725
Shigeo Muto, Ryo Kawasaki, Jun Wako
Publication date: 15 February 2021
Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_99
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