Static Games

DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_517zbMath1457.91025OpenAlexW4247698537MaRDI QIDQ5149728

Oscar Volij

Publication date: 15 February 2021

Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_517

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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