Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games

DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_103zbMath1454.91040OpenAlexW3125599027MaRDI QIDQ5149729

Françoise Forges

Publication date: 15 February 2021

Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_103

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

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