Repeated Games with Complete Information
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Publication:5149731
DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_451zbMath1457.91067OpenAlexW4285717604MaRDI QIDQ5149731
Tristan Tomala, Olivier Gossner
Publication date: 15 February 2021
Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_451
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