Signaling Games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5149736
DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_481zbMath1454.91041OpenAlexW4246368535MaRDI QIDQ5149736
Publication date: 15 February 2021
Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_481
2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Related Items (2)
Signaling games in multiple dimensions: geometric properties of equilibrium solutions ⋮ False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Informal communication
- Comparative cheap talk
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- Communication between rational agents
- A two-person game of information transmission
- Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
- Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- An experimental analysis of Nash refinements in signaling games
- A model of pre-game communication
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
- Coordination and learning with a partial language
- Modeling language evolution
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
- Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
- Professional advice
- A Model of Expertise
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
- Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
- Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
- A Multistage Model of Bargaining
- A Theory of Credibility
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Strategic Delay in Bargaining
- Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
- Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
- Informational Equilibrium
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
- Strict Single Crossing and the Strict Spence-Mirrlees Condition: A Comment on Monotone Comparative Statics
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
- Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
- Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Long Cheap Talk
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
This page was built for publication: Signaling Games
