Mechanism Design
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Publication:5149740
DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_327zbMath1454.91055OpenAlexW4248217320MaRDI QIDQ5149740
Publication date: 15 February 2021
Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_327
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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