Misallocation in the Market for Inputs: Enforcement and the Organization of Production*
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Publication:5149939
DOI10.1093/QJE/QJAA020zbMath1457.91207OpenAlexW2889526676MaRDI QIDQ5149939
Ezra Oberfield, Johannes Boehm
Publication date: 9 February 2021
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1572.pdf
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
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Coase meets Bellman: dynamic programming for production networks ⋮ Contracts, firm dynamics, and aggregate productivity ⋮ Industrialization and the evolution of enforcement institutions
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