Misallocation in the Market for Inputs: Enforcement and the Organization of Production*

DOI10.1093/QJE/QJAA020zbMath1457.91207OpenAlexW2889526676MaRDI QIDQ5149939

Ezra Oberfield, Johannes Boehm

Publication date: 9 February 2021

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1572.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

productivitycontract enforcementequilibrium organization of production

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items (3)

Coase meets Bellman: dynamic programming for production networks ⋮ Contracts, firm dynamics, and aggregate productivity ⋮ Industrialization and the evolution of enforcement institutions

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