Implementation Theory - MaRDI portal

DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_283zbMath1458.91080OpenAlexW4211007121MaRDI QIDQ5150289

Publication date: 15 February 2021

Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_283

zbMATH Keywords

social choice rules implementation theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
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The scholarship assignment problem
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Credible implementation
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Revelation in informational dynamic settings
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Stopping agents from ``cheating
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The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
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Repeated implementation
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To merge or not to merge: that is the question
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The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
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Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
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Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
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Voting by Committees
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Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies
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Incentives in Teams
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
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Implementation and Renegotiation
Toward Natural Implementation
Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
Fault Tolerant Implementation
Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments
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Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
Voluntary implementation