Two-Sided Matching Models
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Publication:5150290
DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_572zbMath1458.91147OpenAlexW1487827769MaRDI QIDQ5150290
Publication date: 15 February 2021
Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_572
Cites Work
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