Market Games and Clubs
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Publication:5150293
DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_318zbMath1454.91102OpenAlexW4249799972MaRDI QIDQ5150293
Publication date: 15 February 2021
Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_318
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
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