Voting

DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_584zbMath1458.91077OpenAlexW4233512289MaRDI QIDQ5150300

Antonio Penta, Deniz Selman, Michela M. Tincani, Alvaro Sandroni, Jonathan Pogach

Publication date: 15 February 2021

Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_584

zbMATH Keywords

Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremvoting ruleswelfare economicsArrow's impossibility theoremcollective choice problempolitical competition and strategic votingpolitical ignorance and Condorcet jury theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

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• The calculus of ethical voting
• A group majority voting model of public good provision
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Large Poisson games
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• Mathematical Derivation of an Election System

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