Voting Procedures, Complexity of
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Publication:5150301
DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_585zbMath1455.91083OpenAlexW4211113147MaRDI QIDQ5150301
Publication date: 15 February 2021
Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_585
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