Networks and Stability

DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_355zbMath1455.91058OpenAlexW4210961440MaRDI QIDQ5150303

Frank H. jun. Page, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 15 February 2021

Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_355

zbMATH Keywords

strong stabilitypairwise stabilityNash stabilityabstract games of network formation and stabilityfarsighted consistencySingleton basins of attraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43)

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