Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation

DOI10.1613/jair.1.13136OpenAlexW3203307869MaRDI QIDQ5154768

Moshe Tennenholtz, Ron Lavi, Yotam Gafni

Publication date: 5 October 2021

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.09216

zbMATH Keywords

game theorydecision theoryautonomous agentsmathematical foundations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

Cites Work

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• Voting power and proportional representation of voters
• Some inequalities relating to the partial sum of binomial probabilities
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• Analyzing Power in Weighted Voting Games with Super-Increasing Weights
• False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games
• Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games
• Singular Games have Asymptotic Values
• Power, prices, and incomes in voting systems
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• False‐Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games: Empirical and Theoretical Analysis
• False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games is Hard for Probabilistic Polynomial Time

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