An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
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Publication:516060
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.003zbMath1395.91172OpenAlexW2580628134MaRDI QIDQ516060
Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Ton Storcken, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 20 March 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/174fd0e6-1f99-4186-b2e2-ee15bfc952df
Related Items (5)
On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions ⋮ Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains ⋮ The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules ⋮ A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
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