Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced?
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Publication:516064
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.004zbMath1395.91292OpenAlexW2586512380MaRDI QIDQ516064
J. George Shanthikumar, Thomas Marschak, Junjie Zhou
Publication date: 20 March 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.004
Cites Work
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