Trader matching and the selection of market institutions

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.001zbMath1395.91194OpenAlexW2586882760MaRDI QIDQ516066

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Johannes Buckenmaier

Publication date: 20 March 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.001

zbMATH Keywords

matchingstochastic stabilitylaw of one pricemarket institution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Effect of strategy-assortativity on investor sharing games in the market

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