A minimal logic for interactive epistemology

DOI10.1007/s11229-015-0960-5zbMath1396.03019OpenAlexW2217675388MaRDI QIDQ516245

Emiliano Lorini

Publication date: 14 March 2017

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0960-5

zbMATH Keywords

complexityepistemic logicaxiomatizationepistemic game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items

Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis ⋮ Reasoning about rationality ⋮ Epistemic reasoning about rationality and bids in auctions

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