Trust and betrayals: Reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment

DOI10.3982/TE4182zbMath1475.91025arXiv2006.08071OpenAlexW3159772048MaRDI QIDQ5164463

Harry Di Pei

Publication date: 11 November 2021

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.08071

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium behaviorreputationequilibrium payoffno commitment type

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types ⋮ A reputation for honesty ⋮ Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling ⋮ Repeated communication with private lying costs

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