Costly miscalibration
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Publication:5164464
DOI10.3982/TE3991zbMath1475.91035OpenAlexW4241256828MaRDI QIDQ5164464
Publication date: 11 November 2021
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3991
Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
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