Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
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Publication:5164517
DOI10.3982/TE4137zbMath1474.91112OpenAlexW3186679142MaRDI QIDQ5164517
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Publication date: 11 November 2021
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4137
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Quantifying incentive (in)compatibility: a case study from sports ⋮ Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents ⋮ Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis ⋮ School choice with preference rank classes ⋮ Manipulability in school choice
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