Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games

DOI10.3982/TE3967zbMath1475.91006OpenAlexW3134922070MaRDI QIDQ5164523

Guilherme Carmona, Konrad Podczeck

Publication date: 11 November 2021

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3967

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumgeneric propertylarge gamespure strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Spaces of games (91A70)

Related Items (4)

Pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games ⋮ On constrained generalized games with action sets in non-locally-convex and non-Hausdorff topological vector spaces ⋮ Strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium in large finite-player games when the action set is a manifold ⋮ On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games

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