Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-43948-7_33zbMath1410.91246arXiv1304.7048OpenAlexW1487301434MaRDI QIDQ5167758

Shahar Dobzinski, Renato Paes Leme

Publication date: 1 July 2014

Published in: Automata, Languages, and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1304.7048

zbMATH Keywords

liquid welfarePareto-efficiencyauctions with budgets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (14)

Learning in auctions: regret is hard, envy is easy ⋮ Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Two-Sided Markets ⋮ Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions ⋮ A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints ⋮ Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations ⋮ On the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources ⋮ Efficient money burning in general domains ⋮ Online random sampling for budgeted settings ⋮ Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints ⋮ On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets ⋮ Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the AdWords Polytope ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Autobidding with constraints ⋮ The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users

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