The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
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Publication:516968
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.009zbMath1394.91055OpenAlexW2521137217MaRDI QIDQ516968
Levent Koçkesen, Duygu Ozdemir, Seda Ertac
Publication date: 16 March 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/17640/1/1-s2.0-S0899825616300884-main.pdf
cheap talklyingpersuasionstrategic communicationdisclosurelab experimentsmultiple audiencesperformance feedback
Uses Software
Cites Work
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