Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games

DOI10.1287/moor.2013.0594zbMath1297.91028OpenAlexW1991342600MaRDI QIDQ5169682

Tristan Tomala

Publication date: 11 July 2014

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2013.0594

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesincomplete informationimperfect monitoringcommunication equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games ⋮ A differential game on Wasserstein space. Application to weak approachability with partial monitoring ⋮ Exponential weight approachability, applications to calibration and regret minimization

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