Optimal allocation of an indivisible good

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.004zbMath1394.91253OpenAlexW2127550107MaRDI QIDQ516975

Lin Zhou, Ran Shao

Publication date: 16 March 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.004

zbMATH Keywords

budget balanceaverage efficiencydominance incentive mechanismsfixed-price mechanismsoption mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading ⋮ Balanced ranking mechanisms

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