Social surplus determines cooperation rates in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma
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Publication:516976
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.010zbMath1394.91081MaRDI QIDQ516976
Gary Charness, Luca Rigotti, Aldo Rustichini
Publication date: 16 March 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (4)
Evolution of cooperation through adaptive interaction in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Equilibrium as compatibility of plans ⋮ Opportunistic conformism
Cites Work
- Endogenous transfers in the prisoner's dilemma game: an experimental test of cooperation and coordination
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Beliefs and actions in the trust game: creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect
- Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games
- Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
- Magical thinking: A representation result
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
- Promises and Partnership
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