Local incentive compatibility with transfers

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.009zbMath1394.91172OpenAlexW2181756129MaRDI QIDQ516980

Souvik Roy, Anup Pramanik, Debasis Mishra

Publication date: 16 March 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.009

zbMATH Keywords

local incentive compatibilityordinal type spacepayment-only incentive compatibilitysingle peaked type space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains, Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments

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