Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.011zbMath1394.91164OpenAlexW2526417918MaRDI QIDQ516984

Vladimir A. Karamychev, Maarten C. W. Janssen

Publication date: 16 March 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.011

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial auctionsraising rivals' costspiteful bidingtelecom markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Auctions with financial externalities
• Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions
• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions

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