Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
From MaRDI portal
Publication:516993
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.006zbMath1394.91111OpenAlexW2528901763MaRDI QIDQ516993
Publication date: 16 March 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.006
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