Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.09.013zbMath1394.91257OpenAlexW2529999154MaRDI QIDQ516996

Andreas Grunewald, Simon Dato, Matthias Kräkel, Daniel Müller

Publication date: 16 March 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.013

zbMATH Keywords

invisibility hypothesispoachingpromotion-as-signal hypothesis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Market signaling with grades
• Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium
• Corporate Tournaments, Human Capital Acquisition, and the Firm Size-Wage Relation
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution
• A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications
• Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
• Contractual Incompleteness, Unemployment, and Labour Market Segmentation
• The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data
• The Wage Policy of a Firm
• Strategic Promotion and Compensation
• A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms
• Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions

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